A tale of two peoples: motivated reasoning in the aftermath of the Brexit Vote by Sorace, Miriam & Hobolt, Sara Binzer
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Sorace, Miriam and Hobolt, Sara Binzer   (2020) A tale of two peoples: motivated reasoning in
the aftermath of the Brexit Vote.   Political Science Research and Methods .    ISSN 2049-8470.
DOI




A Tale of Two Peoples: Motivated Reasoning in




Motivated Reasoning in the Aftermath of the Brexit Vote
Abstract
Partisanship is a powerful driver of economic perceptions. Yet we know
less about whether other political divisions may lead to similar evaluative bi-
ases. In this article, we explore how the salient divide between ‘Remainers’
and ‘Leavers’ in the UK in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum has given
rise to biased economic perceptions. In line with the cognitive dissonance
framework, we argue that salient non-partisan divisions can change economic
perceptions by triggering processes of self- and in-group justification. Using
both nationally-representative observational and experimental survey data,
we demonstrate that the perceptions of the economy are shaped by the Brexit
divide, and that these biases are exacerbated when respondents are reminded
of Brexit. These findings indicate that perceptual biases are not always rooted
in partisanship, but can be triggered by other political divisions.
Keywords: Perceptual Bias; Economic Perceptions; Accountability; Ref-
erendums; Brexit
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Introduction
Are economic perceptions shaped by objective information or in-group biases? The
classic economic voting literature assumes that voters evaluate the economy objec-
tively and sanction incumbents accordingly (Fiorina 1978; 1981, Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2000). This is at the heart of the sanctioning model of elections, where
voters reward governments when the economy is doing well and punish them when
it is doing badly (Key 1966). Yet, numerous studies of motivated reasoning have
found that partisanship creates a ‘perceptual lens’ through which people perceive
the world (Campbell et al. 1960, Zaller 1992, Bartels 2002, Redlawsk 2002, Lodge
et al. 2006, Bisgaard 2015, Lauderdale 2016). Economic perceptions, they argue,
are no exception to this. Voters attached to different parties will perceive the same
economy very differently: rosy if their favored party is in government, bleak if it is in
opposition (Evans and Andersen 2006, Evans and Pickup 2010, De Vries et al. 2018,
Enns et al. 2012, Wlezien et al. 1997, De Boef and Kellstedt 2004). The literature on
motivated reasoning in political science has focused on the role of partisanship, but
has paid less attention to the impact of alternative, non-partisan, fault-lines in acti-
vating perceptual biases (Leeper and Slothuus 2014). In this paper we ask: can other
salient political divisions also trigger perceptual biases in economic evaluations?
To address this question, we apply the theoretical framework of cognitive disso-
nance to the 2016 referendum on British membership of the European Union. The
historic decision of British voters to narrowly reject the status-quo of four decades of
EU membership (‘Brexit’) came as a surprise to many, and gave rise to salient new
political identities linked to the division between ‘Remainers’ and ‘Leavers’ (Evans
and Schaffner 2019, Curtice 2018, Hobolt et al. 2020, Richards et al. 2018). What is
more, the Brexit fault-line internally divided the Conservative and Labour parties,
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each with significant pockets of both Leave and Remain voters and MPs (Evans and
Menon 2017). The Brexit divide therefore provides an apposite case to examine
perceptual biases triggered by a salient political divide which cuts across traditional
partisan lines.
To test motivated reasoning in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, we combine
observational and experimental data. First, we analyze the British Election Study
(BES) 2014-2018 panel (Fieldhouse et al. 2018) to compare both current and retro-
spective assessments of the UK economy by Leavers and Remainers pre- and post-
referendum, controlling for partisanship. Second, to determine whether perceptual
biases due to Brexit are stronger when the relevant in-group is primed, we designed
a survey experiment, fielded with YouGov in July 2018. Finally, we also use the
survey-embedded experiment to test whether economic perceptions shaped by the
Brexit vote can be corrected by factual information. Studies have shown that par-
tisan perceptual biases are not ameliorated by corrective information, since factual
information itself is processed with bias (Kuklinski et al. 2000, Nyhan and Reifler
2010, Flynn et al. 2017, Lauderdale 2016). We examine if Brexit-related priors are
similarly resistant to information.
The findings show that the Brexit referendum created a new ‘perceptual screen’
that shaped people’s perceptions of the economy in the UK. Controlling for parti-
sanship, the Brexit divide has an independent effect on economic perceptions. While
Remainers and Leavers did not differ significantly in their economic perceptions in
the run-up to the referendum, this changed after the vote: Remainers became more
pessimistic about the economy while Leavers remained fairly optimistic in the imme-
diate post-referendum period. The effect is stronger among voters than non-voters,
suggesting that the act of voting in the 2016 referendum encouraged people to seek
consistency between their vote and their evaluations of the economy. Moreover,
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results from the experiment show that Leaver/Remainer differences in economic
perceptions are further enhanced when their referendum in-group is primed, and
persist even when Remainers and Leavers are given identical factual information.
This indicates that biased attitudes post-Brexit operate in a similar manner to par-
tisan biases, as they are enhanced by in-group priming and are largely unaffected
by corrective factual information.
This study thus contributes to the literature on economic perceptions and eco-
nomic voting. We extend the work on economic perceptions and motivated rea-
soning by demonstrating how non-partisan political divisions can shape economic
perceptions. The paper also offers important evidence on the role of referendums
in generating political divisions that cut across partisan ones and affect electoral
accountability. This has broader normative implications for the debate on the role
of referendums in modern representative democracies. One of the criticisms of refer-
endums is their majoritarian nature, which can result in societal polarization (Setälä
1999). The presence of strong perceptual biases along Brexit-lines is one indicator
that referendums can deepen social divisions by triggering self- and group-serving
processes of justification.
Economic Perceptions and Partisanship
The economic voting model posits that the economy is a powerful driver of voting
behavior. It assumes that voters will punish incumbents when the economy is doing
well and throw the rascals out when it is performing poorly (Key 1966, Tilley et al.
2018). As such, economic conditions provide a powerful heuristic to voters to judge
the quality of governments and allow them to hold politicians to account. While it
is too costly for voters to evaluate incumbents’ past records comprehensively, they
can more easily review the state of the country’s economy. Numerous studies have
5
Motivated Reasoning in the Aftermath of the Brexit Vote
demonstrated a link between objective macro-economic indicators (e.g. employment,
inflation and real income), subjective individual-level evaluations of the country’s
economy, and incumbent approval and electoral support. They conclude that incum-
bents do better when the economy is doing well, and, conversely, lose votes when the
economy is shrinking (Kramer 1971, Fiorina 1978, Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; 1981,
Kiewiet and Rivers 1984, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). When controlling for
partisanship, however, this relationship seems to weaken or even disappear (Enns
et al. 2012, Donovan et al. 2019). This has been explained by positing that parti-
sanship itself could be influenced by governments’ economic performance (Fiorina
1981).
But other scholars suggest that the causal arrow runs in the opposite direction,
and that economic perceptions are not simply based on objective information of the
economy, but rather shaped by individuals’ partisanship (Evans and Andersen 2006,
Evans and Pickup 2010, Enns et al. 2012, Bisgaard 2015). The political behavior
literature has documented pervasive motivated reasoning among voters: humans
have an innate tendency to selectively acquire and process information. We take
longer in processing counter-attitudinal information, we often dispute it through
counter-argument, or avoid it altogether (Lodge et al. 2006, Redlawsk 2002; 2006,
Lauderdale 2016). Economic evaluations are not immune to motivated reasoning.
Bartels (2002) finds that Democrats and Republicans diverge in their perceptions
of unemployment and inflation, and that their perceptions fail to track the eco-
nomic reality. Similarly, Evans and Andersen (2006) and Evans and Pickup (2010)
find that political support for the party in government has a very strong effect on
sociotropic evaluations of the UK and US economies, while examining the inverse
relationship, from economic perceptions to voting behavior or presidential approval
does not yield significant results. In a similar vein, Enns et al.(2012) demonstrate
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that Democrats (Republicans) are more optimistic about the economy when a Demo-
crat (Republican) occupies the White House. Moreover, they find that when the
partisan component of economic evaluations is filtered out from the time series, eco-
nomic perceptions are no longer significantly associated with presidential approval.
Bisgaard (2015) demonstrates that Labour supporters are more optimistic about
the UK economy than Conservative supporters when Labour is in government, and
De Vries et al. (2018) further show that government supporters always hold more
optimistic views about the economy compared to opposition partisans. Partisans
thus appear to polarize over economic performance, instead of converging to the
‘true’ value.
What is more, research has shown that partisan perceptual biases appear to be
resistant to factual information: objective information not only fails to change false
beliefs, but in some cases it even exacerbates them (the ‘backfire’ effect). Kuklinski
et al (2000) show that providing relevant facts on social welfare did not improve the
accuracy of experiment participants’ knowledge of welfare facts. Similarly, Bullock
(2007) provide experimental evidence to show that discrediting factual claims can
lead to belief perseverance and ideological polarization. In another experiment on
the Iraq war, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) demonstrate that Democrats and Republi-
cans respond differently to corrective information and that corrective information
backfires: it leads to an over-reaction from the group most congruent with the mis-
information, and thus ends up increasing ideological polarization. Accuracy-based
reasoning is therefore a rare occurrence while perceptual biases are pervasive (Leeper
and Slothuus 2014, Zaller 1992, Enns et al. 2012, Lauderdale 2016). Bisgaard (2015)
finds some evidence of belief updating by Labour and Conservative partisans, but
only after facing the incontrovertible economic decline of 2007-8, an information
shock produced by one of the worst crises since 1929. However, even then, while
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voters converged to a similar and truthful assessment of economic reality, they po-
larized over who was to blame, hindering full accountability (Tilley and Hobolt
2011).
These findings challenge a core assumption of the classic economic voting model,
namely that vote choices are driven by objective assessments of economic perfor-
mance. Yet, less attention has been paid to whether other political divisions that
cross-cut partisanship also bias economic perceptions in a similar way as partisanship
does. It is important to understand whether other political divisions and events can
similarly shape how voters evaluate the economy as this has implications for elec-
toral accountability (Campbell et al. 1960, Conover and Feldman 1981, Leeper and
Slothuus 2014, Barber and Pope 2019). In this paper, we examine this question by
looking at economic perceptions in the aftermath of the divisive Brexit referendum.
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Brexit and Motivated Reasoning
Partisanship is not the only political divide that can lead to polarized economic
perceptions. Building on social psychology, we argue that any high-stakes and con-
sequential choice situation can induce voters to strongly commit to the choice made,
creating incentives to rationalize their actions by, for example, modifying subsequent
cognitions, and/or shifting responsibility attributions. Research on cognitive disso-
nance has shown that individuals seek to actively avoid cognitive inconsistency and
consequently they engage in ex post rationalizations that may distort any new cog-
nition in the direction of a prior one that they need to ‘defend’ (Festinger 1957,
Cooper 2007). When inconsistencies between two cognitions arise, individuals thus
tend to either: (a) modify the incongruent cognition, (b) counter-argue it through
the bolstering of congruent items of information, or (c) attribute it to some other
factor (responsibility shift). Since concrete behaviors - such as voting - are more dif-
ficult to distort, individuals will innately attempt to modify their perceptions of the
consequences of their behaviors (Festinger 1957, Cooper 2007). These arguments are
compatible with arguments from the motivated reasoning literature, which argues
that directional reasoning is the result of memory/information searches biased by
priors, or by processes of justification construction (Hahn and Harris 2014, Kunda
1990, Lauderdale 2016, Lodge et al. 2006). We argue that motivated reasoning trig-
gered by non-partisan fault-lines, has the same properties as party-based directional
motivated reasoning: it leads to biases in economic perceptions and to resistance to
factual information.
The cognitive dissonance framework also argues that not all cognitive inconsis-
tencies will generate cognitive bias: only aversive choice situations have the potential
to trigger awareness of cognitive inconsistency and, as a consequence, to trigger the
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emotional state of dissonance and the need to distort opinions and beliefs (Festinger
1957, Cooper 2007). In other words, a choice situation that is not aversive, i.e.
not likely to generate strong consequences - such as choosing between two yoghurt
brands, for example - will not generate the desire to defend one’s choice by altering,
say, taste perceptions or by reinforcing positive beliefs towards the brand chosen.
In the case of electoral choice, the state of dissonance is more likely to arise, and it
will be strongest, where contests are particularly salient and consequential. More-
over, perceptual biases are expected to be more severe when ‘vicarious’ cognitive
dissonance is also elicited. Vicarious dissonance arises when the individual wants
to justify not only his/her choices but also those of an in-group. In choice situ-
ations that generate in-group/out-group dynamics, perceptual biases are therefore
expected to be even more pronounced (Cooper 2007). To summarize, cognitive dis-
sonance theory broadly hypothesizes that a) individuals will bias their cognition in
the direction of prior behaviors/actions; b) the more aversive the consequence of
one’s behavior, the stronger the cognitive distortions (i.e. perceptual biases); c) the
more one’s behavior/action is linked to that of an in-group (i.e.vicariousness), the
stronger the cognitive distortions.
As discussed in the introduction, the Brexit referendum created a choice sit-
uation that clearly meets the above criteria. Leaving the European Union is an
unprecedented event1 which entails significant reforms to many public policy areas.
The referendum has exponentially increased the salience of the EU issue dimension
and even triggered social identification with ‘Remainer - Leaver’ groupings (Evans
and Schaffner 2019, Curtice 2018, Hobolt et al. 2020, Richards et al. 2018). Due
to the significance of the choice situation, we expect that UK voters would distort
1Greenland, an autonomous constituent country of Denmark, left the European Community in
1985 after a referendum in 1982, but the UK was the first member state to leave the EU.
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their perception of the UK’s economy performance after the referendum outcome
was known, and in the direction of their vote choice.
Following the cognitive dissonance framework outlined above, we hypothesize
that perceptual biases would occur only after the referendum, and would be evident
both within individuals over time (individual changes in perceptions pre- and post-
referendum) and between Remainers and Leavers. After the referendum outcome,
Remainers are expected to adjust their perceptions of the economy to view it more
negatively, and thereby aligning their perceptions with one of the key arguments
for voting Remain, namely that Brexit will have a negative effect on the economy.
Having committed - through their referendum choice - to the notion that Brexit
would be bad for the economy, they adjust their perception of the economy accord-
ingly, in a process of self-justification. In contrast, we expect Leavers to make either
no adjustment to their perceptions of the economy or make a positive adjustment,
since the economic argument was less integral to the argument for voting Leave and
the economic warnings from the Remain-campaign were labeled ‘Project Fear’ by
the Leave-campaign (Hobolt 2016). Consequently, we expect to see divergence in
perceptions of the economy after the referendum outcome is known. Specifically, we
hypothesize that:
H1a: After the Brexit referendum outcome was known, Remainers (who favored
the status quo) became more negative in their economic perceptions compared to
before the vote, while Leavers became more positive.
H1b: After the Brexit referendum outcome was known, Remainers and Leavers
start diverging in their economic perceptions, with Remainers perceiving the econ-
omy more negatively than Leavers.
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These first hypotheses will be tested via panel data analysis, which allows us
to track both within and between individual-level change. To further demonstrate
that cognitive dissonance is the mechanism through which the EU issue dimension is
biasing economic evaluations, we have designed a survey experiment with a priming
treatment, where respondents are reminded of the referendum and of their Brexit-
related in-groups. Our expectation is that Brexit-induced motivated reasoning is
stronger when respondents are reminded of their in-group. This would provide ad-
ditional evidence indicating that cognitive dissonance is driving the perceptual bias,
since the triggering of vicarious dissonance is expected to strengthen the need to
justify one’s actions. We hypothesize the following:
H2: When primed to think about their ‘Leaver’ vs. ‘Remainer’ in-group alle-
giances, the gap in economic perceptions between Remainers and Leavers will be
greater than when not primed.
To further examine that Brexit-induced biases in economic perceptions act sim-
ilarly to partisan ones, we include an experimental factor that manipulates respon-
dent’s access to economic information. The expectation is that since both Remainers
and Leavers in the information treatment group receive the same information, their
economic perceptions should converge. However, if we find that these groups, when
exposed to the same factual report on the UK’s economic performance, do not con-
verge in their perceptions, it would be an indication that they are less attentive to
counter-attitudinal information and are instead bolstering congruent pieces of infor-
mation in line with their Brexit vote. This would suggest that Brexit-induced biases
are similar to partisan ones with regards to resistance to information. However, the
12
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baseline hypothesis is that information leads to convergence in economic perceptions:
H3: When individuals receive factual information about the UK’s economy,
the perceptual gap between Remainers and Leavers on economic conditions will be
reduced.
13
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Panel Data Analysis and Results
We test Hypotheses 1a and 1b by analyzing the British Election Study (BES) 2014-
2018 internet panel data (Fieldhouse et al. 2018). To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we use
a survey experiment that was fielded with YouGov in July 2018. The advantage of a
panel data analysis is that it allows to track economic perceptions’ change between
Leavers and Remainers over-time as well as change within individual respondents.
In the panel data analysis, the unit of analysis is the respondent-wave. The panel
follows the same individuals – representative of the UK population – over the 14
waves. Each wave has approximately 30,000 respondents. The main analyses pre-
sented below do not correct for panel drop outs and therefore adopt complete case
analysis, which simply removes any within-wave missingness and assumes missing
records are MCAR (Missing Completely At Random). However, in Table A2 in
the Appendix we offer a robustness check using respondents who completed all 14
survey waves, following the suggestion by Verbeek and Nijman (1992). The number
of respondents who completed all 14 waves is 4,191. The same regression model
was therefore run on this small non-attrition sub-sample, and the key results do not
change.
We code each respondent as a Leaver, Remainer or Independent (‘Abstainer/Don’t
Know’) on the basis of their referendum vote intention response to the survey ques-
tion:“if there was a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union,
how do you think you would vote?”, in each relevant survey wave. Respondents
could choose between Remain, Leave, Would not vote/Don’t know.2
2One concern might be that the effects are due to sorting: e.g. people who become more
pessimistic about the economy may then report that they are considering voting Remain in a
future referendum. To dispel concerns that the findings are due to sorting, we also run the analysis
by coding each respondent as a Leaver and a Remainer on the basis of their reported 2016 vote
choice in Wave 9 only - the post-referendum wave, where the vote intention item becomes a vote
recall survey question. Even when doing this results do not change (see Table A3 in the Appendix).
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The dependent variables - perceptions of current and retrospective economic
performance - will be regressed on the interaction between Leave/Remain vote in-
tention - as expressed in each survey wave - and the relevant panel study wave.
The interaction is the crucial measure of biased economic perceptions, as it allows
to track wave-by-wave changes in perceptions of economic performance (Bisgaard
2015, Hahn and Harris 2014). If there is divergence between Leavers and Remain-
ers after the referendum, this supports the hypothesis that perceptual biases have
emerged as a result of the EU referendum. We therefore show patterns before and
after the threshold (referendum wave) to investigate whether there is convergence
or divergence among Leavers and Remainers, and whether Leavers and Remainers
changed perceptions pre- and post-referendum. Importantly, we control for party
identification as well as education, personal income, gender and age. The data is
modeled via autoregressive panel OLS regressions with random effects and cluster
robust standard errors at the individual level (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
By examining retrospective as well as current economic perceptions, we can test
whether motivated reasoning shapes people’s views of the economy in the imme-
diate aftermath of the referendum, without capturing their expectations of what
might happen after Britain has left the EU. The retrospective economic evaluation
dependent variable is valuable to include alongside current economic perceptions,
since the wording of the current economic evaluation survey item may lead respon-
dents to consider the future as well as the current state of the economy, whereas the
retrospective evaluation is not easily contaminated by any considerations about the
future economic consequences of Brexit.
Economic perceptions are thus measured by the following 5 point Likert-scale
survey items of the BES:
• Do you think that the economy is getting better, getting worse or staying about
15
Motivated Reasoning in the Aftermath of the Brexit Vote
the same?
• How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed
over the last 12 months? Has it: got a lot worse, got a little worse, stayed the
same, got a little better or got a lot better?
The results highlight that, controlling for party identification, Remainers and
Leavers perceive the current state of the economy very similarly to independents
(and to each other) before the referendum. Coefficients are small and not consis-
tently statistically significant. When statistically significant, the interactions have
similar signs, instead of diverging ones. Remain-Leave vote intentions were therefore
not acting as perceptual screens before the referendum itself. Perceptions started
to diverge considerably post-referendum. From wave 9 (June/July 2016) onwards,
Remainers became consistently more pessimistic than independents, while Leavers
became consistently and significantly more optimistic than independents. The gap
in economic perceptions along Brexit-lines thus only appears evident after the ref-
erendum, suggesting that these are ex-post rationalizations of the vote.
These patterns are confirmed when we try to predict retrospective evaluations of
the economy, which provide clearer evidence of biased cognitive processes. If such
Brexit-related changes in performance evaluations are at play also when evaluat-
ing the UK’s past economic situation, it can be more clearly inferred that respon-
dents are biased, in that they deviate from an actual benchmark. Again, keeping
party identification constant, Remainers and Leavers did not evaluate the UK’s
past economy fundamentally differently before the referendum. Comparisons be-
tween Leavers, Remainers and independents (the baseline category) were not ro-
bustly significant and when significant, the effects were very small and went in the
same direction. However, in wave 10 (November-December 2016), the next avail-
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able post-referendum wave for the retrospective item, perceptions of past economic
performance between Leavers and Remainers start to significantly diverge. In the
November/December 2016 wave, Remainers were 0.42 points more pessimistic than
independents, while Leavers - almost a mirror-image - were 0.24 units more opti-






















































Economy is Getting Better
Figure 1: Current Economy Performance
Note: Linear Predictions of Present Evaluations. Higher values indicate more optimism (economy
is getting better). Covariate profile held constant at modal/mean categories: Labour, 56-65 age
bracket, A-level educational attainment, female, income: 10-20k.
The marginal effects graphs (Figure 1 and 2) better illustrate the interaction
effects, as they show the gaps between Leavers, Remainers and independents. The
predicted probability graphs show pre-referendum convergence among Leavers and
Remainers in both present and retrospective evaluations of the economy, followed
by significant perceptual gaps immediately after the referendum. The divergence in
economic perceptions of the two camps narrowed somewhat in subsequent survey
waves, but remained sizable and significant.
Unsurprisingly, we also find that respondents voting for the party in government
throughout this period (the Conservative Party) are more optimistic than inde-
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Economy Got Better in last 12 months
Figure 2: Retrospective Economy Performance
Note: Linear Predictions of Retrospective Evaluations. Higher values indicate more optimism
(economy got better). Covariate profile held constant at modal/mean categories: Labour, 56-65
age bracket, A-level educational attainment, female, income: 10-20k
.
pendents (the baseline category) on both present and retrospective evaluations, by
roughly 0.4 of a Likert scale unit. Voters of the main opposition party (Labour)
evaluate the present and retrospective economy more pessimistically than indepen-
dents, and the same is true for SNP, Plaid Cymru and Green Party voters as well
as voters of other parties. UKIP voters share the Conservative voters’ optimism
on the current state of the economy, while they are not statistically significantly
different than independents on retrospective evaluations. Liberal Democrats’ voters
are indistinguishable from independents in current evaluations and slightly more
optimistic in their retrospective evaluations of the economy. Hence, the patterns
expected by the partisanship literature (economic optimism of election winners and
pessimism of losers/opposition) are confirmed here (Anderson et al. 2005).
As far as demographic controls are concerned, the more educated and well-off
respondents are more likely to view present and retrospective economic conditions
18
Sorace, M. Hobolt, S. B.
positively. Older respondents and females hold more pessimistic perceptions of the
current/retrospective economy than younger respondents and male respondents.
To dispel concerns that the multi-collinearity between partisanship and referen-
dum vote intention can bias the estimator we also re-ran the same models without
partisanship as a control. The results are available in the online Appendix (Ta-
ble A4), and the inferences drawn above remain valid when removing this control.
Moreover, to further explore the interaction between partisanship and Brexit-related
attitudes, we also ran a triple interaction model (see table A5 in the Appendix) with
partisanship. Figure 1 and 2 in the online Appendix (which summarise the regres-
sion model in table A5) visually demonstrate the results of the three-way interaction.
The perceptual gap persists even when examining Leave/Remain in-groups within
party groupings: conservative voters grow more polarised on economic perceptions
along Brexit lines and, even if their party is in government, conservative respondents
that are pro-Remain become more pessimistic on the economy. The same patterns
are evident within Labour too (and other parties as well).
One alternative reading of the results could be that the divergence in percep-
tions is driven by the increased salience of the Brexit issue in the wake of the
referendum. According to this view, it is the increase in salience of Brexit, together
with the diverging expectations of the consequences of Brexit, that pushes Leavers
and Remainers to update their views on the economy differently in the wake of the
referendum outcome. To provide further evidence that the divergence is driven by
cognitive dissonance processes, we also run a split sample analysis comparing the
trends for actual voters and for non-voters, which complements the dynamic analysis
of pre-referendum parallel trends and post-referendum divergence provided above.
Using the survey item on turnout in the EU referendum (first asked in wave 10
19
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- November/December 2016)3, we can distinguish between Remainers and Leavers
who voted vs. Remainers and Leavers who reported having abstained. As mentioned
above, the classification of respondents as Leavers or Remainers was based on a vote
intention survey item, which does not capture the concrete act of voting, but rather
pro-Remain and pro-Leave self-identification. The observable implication of our cog-
nitive dissonance hypothesis is that the incentive to engage in cognitive modification
is stronger for individuals who have behaviorally committed to an in-group (in our
case, the Leave-Remain camps). Therefore, we should expect that post-referendum
perceptual change and divergence among Leavers and Remainers is stronger for in-
dividuals who actually voted, and weaker in individuals who - although having a
position on Brexit - did not vote.
The results of this alternative specification are presented by way of marginal
plots (see Figure 3 below) and the full results are in the Appendix (tables A6 and
A7).
3The specific question wording of the EU Referendum turnout survey item is: “Talking to
people about the EU referendum on June 23rd, we have found that a lot of people didn’t manage
to vote. How about you? Did you manage to vote in the EU referendum?”
20













































































































































































































































Economy Got Better in last 12 months
Figure 3: Economic Performance Evaluations - Voters vs. Non-Voters
Note: Linear Predictions of Present Evaluations. Higher values indicate more optimism (economy
is getting better / got better). Covariate profile held constant at modal/mean categories: Labour,
56-65 age bracket, A-level educational attainment, female, income: 10-20k.
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The results from the split sample analysis above conform with our expectation
as we see a greater perceptual change and divergence among voters (top row graphs)
than among non-voters (bottom row graphs). Both voters and non-voters are ex-
posed to the referendum outcome and yet the intensity of perceptual biases differs
according to whether an individual actually voted in the referendum. Of course these
results are suggestive, since voters are often more informed and politically interested
than non-voters. We have run a robustness check using only on the sub-sample of
high knowledge respondents4 (see tables A8 and A9 in the Appendix) and the main
results are unchanged: the Leave-Remain perceptual bias is present among voters,
but absent among non-voters, even when keeping respondents’ level of knowledge of
EU affairs constant.
In sum, the results from the panel data show that economic perceptions are bi-
ased along Brexit lines only after the referendum itself and mostly for individuals
who voted in the 2016 referendum. In line with the cognitive dissonance framework,
Remainers rationalize their vote choice by bolstering negative aspects of the UK’s
economy while Leavers do the opposite. This result holds when keeping party iden-
tification and relevant social demographics constant. The findings show that while
Leavers and Remainers did not differ in their economic performance evaluations
before the referendum, polarization is evident after the referendum as Remainers
became significantly more pessimistic about the economy while Leavers become
more optimistic, in line with our cognitive dissonance expectations.
4To measure levels of information, we use the EU knowledge items asked in wave 8 (the pre-
referendum wave) of the British Election Study. The 6 items ask about knowledge of the EU
parliament, the EU budget, the European Court of Human Rights as well as 3 questions on
numbers of members and the membership status of Switzerland and Croatia. The questions were
re-coded (so that a value of 1 means that the respondent answered correctly) and aggregated in an
additive index. On average, respondents gave 3 correct answers. High knowledge respondents are
those that responded correctly to 4 questions or more (36% of the sample). It is important to note
that the EU knowledge index was not highly correlated with the EU Referendum vote intention
variable.
22
Sorace, M. Hobolt, S. B.
Survey Experiment: Analysis and Results
To further examine the psychological mechanism linking the Brexit referendum to
biased economic perceptions, we have conducted an experiment embedded in an
online survey of a nationally representative sample of the adult British population.
The survey design allows us to test for the presence of vicarious dissonance, by
randomly varying exposure to Leave-Remain in-group priming. It also allows us to
test whether factual information on the economy can reduce Leaver/Remainer gaps
in economic perceptions. By manipulating the information available to individuals
about the economy and the salience of their referendum identity, this experiment
offers insights into whether the perceptual biases reported above can be minimized
by factual information or are as obdurate as partisan ones.
Our fully crossed (2x2) survey-based experiment was fielded between July 24-26,
2018 by the reputable survey organization YouGov. 3,267 UK citizens above the age
of 18 took part and were randomly exposed to three experimental and one control
condition. The experimental factors are fully crossed, meaning that we have one
treatment group exposed to the referendum in-group prime only, a second treatment
group exposed to the information condition only, a third treatment group that was
exposed to both identity prime and the information treatments, and a group that was
exposed to neither condition (control group). The individuals in the control group
(no referendum prime and no information) are only asked the economic performance
questions. Balance tests demonstrate that randomized experimental groups do not
differ in key demographic and attitudinal variables (see Table A10 in the Appendix).
The in-group priming treatment asks respondents whether they identify as a
Leaver or Remainer or neither. This is a (subtle) way of priming respondents to
think of Brexit-related social identities. Of those respondents subjected to the prim-
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ing treatment, the vast majority (82.1%) reported identifying as either a Leaver or
a Remainer, highlighting that most people in the UK identify with Brexit identities
(Curtice 2018, Hobolt et al. 2020). Only 14.3% reported no allegiance and 3.6% did
not answer. The treatment was formulated as follows:
Since the EU referendum, some people now think of themselves as ‘Leavers’ and
‘Remainers’, do you think of yourself as a Leaver, a Remainer, neither a Leaver nor
a Remainer?
In our second treatment, we randomly assign respondents to factual information
about UK economic performance. We chose an excerpt from the 2018 report on eco-
nomic growth by the Office for National Statistics5. This source was chosen as it was
the most likely to be perceived as objective by readers. Responses to this treatment
are thus expected to be based on the message itself rather than the source. The
content is a balanced statement on the state of the UK economy: it reports GDP
growth in 2018, but it also reports growth slowing down when compared to previous
periods. The general message that it conveys is that the UK economy is still grow-
ing, albeit more slowly than usual. The cognitive dissonance model would predict
confirmation biases, and hence selective processing of this information: Leavers are
expected to bolster the economic growth message, while Remainers are expected to
bolster the message about how economic growth is slowing down, thus preserving
the polarization between them. Hypothesis 3 expects that factual information can
act as a corrective and reduce polarization among Leavers and Remainers. If it is
rejected, the expectations from the cognitive dissonance model would be corrobo-
5See the January to March 2018 GDP bulletin in the bulletins section of:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp
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rated. The information treatment is worded as follows:
The UK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annual growth rate was 1.2% in the
first quarter of 2018. The UK Office for National Statistics reports that this is the
slowest growth in the UK since 2012.
To measure the outcome variable – perceptions of the UK economic context –
the following survey items were used:
1. How do you think the UK’s economic growth rate currently ranks in comparison
to other the 34 developed countries part of the OECD? Please give a ranking
from 1 to 34, where 1 means that you consider the UK to currently be the best
performing economy in the developed world, while 34 means that the UK is the
worst performing one. If you don’t know the answer, please make your best
guess.
2. Do you think that the economy is getting better, getting worse or staying about
the same?
We have included a ranking variable in the experiment both to provide an alter-
native to the traditional economic perceptions survey item, and to have an objective
benchmark. We know that the OECD ranked the UK economy in the 1st quarter
of 2018 as 32 out of the 34 economies in terms of real GDP growth, and we can
use this information to check respondent’s level of bias and compare Leavers and
Remainers’ responses6. In the case of the first dependent variable, higher num-
bers denote greater economic pessimism (as a rank of 34 would mean that the UK
growth was considered to be the worst performing among the 34 OECD countries),
6https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryName=350
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while the opposite is true for the second economic perception survey item. The
regression table below (Table 1) tests hypotheses 2 and 3, i.e. it examines whether
priming and/or information have an impact on the Leave-Remain perceptual bias.
If the factual information treatment causes Leavers and Remainers to have more
similar economic perceptions, that would provide empirical support for Hypothesis
3. If the in-group prime treatment leads to further divergence, that would support
Hypothesis 2.
We find strong support for Hypothesis 2: priming participants to think about
their Remainer/Leaver in-groups statistically significantly increases the divergence
in their perceptions of the economy. We do not find support for Hypothesis 3: the
information treatment does not statistically significantly change the baseline diver-
gence in perceptions of Leavers and Remainers recorded in the control group. We
find that Leavers report lower (i.e. more positive) ranks of British economic growth
than Remainers, as expected. Leavers’ ranks of the UK economy are further reduced
(by 2.8 points) when they receive the identity priming treatment, and by 1.7 points
lower when they receive both the priming and information treatment, compared
with the control group. Information in conjunction with priming seems to reduce
the effect of Brexit-related identities on opinion-divergence, but without neutraliz-
ing it. The information-only treatment does not change Leavers’ and Remainers’
divergence in perceptions in a statistically significant way. It does shift both Leavers
and Remainers to be slightly more pessimistic, but it is merely an intercept shift
since the perceptual difference between Leavers and Remainers remains of the same
size. There is therefore no evidence of convergence after exposure to identical infor-
mation. That Leavers and Remainers are engaging in selective processing of specific
aspects of the ONS report is therefore a real possibility.
These results are further supported in our analysis of the second dependent
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variable (‘Do you think that the economy is getting better, getting worse or staying
about the same?’) where Leavers report 0.65 of a Likert scale unit higher optimism
on economic performance than Remainers, a difference that is further increased in
the priming treatment (by additional 0.28 units) and in the priming + information
treatment (by additional 0.22 units). Again, we find that the information treatment
does not statistically significantly change the perceptual divergence of Leavers and
Remainers when compared with the perceptual divergence in the control group.
Table 1: Survey Experiment: Regression Results
(1) (2)
Rank of UK Economy Economy is Getting Better
Prime only 1.213 (0.620) -0.0879 (0.0692)
Prime + Info 1.495∗ (0.622) -0.120 (0.0691)
Info only 1.660∗∗ (0.629) -0.0585 (0.0704)
Leave -2.764∗∗∗ (0.629) 0.656∗∗∗ (0.0702)
Prime only × Leave -2.814∗∗ (0.881) 0.279∗∗ (0.0988)
Prime + Info × Leave -1.721∗ (0.869) 0.220∗ (0.0968)
Info only × Leave -0.305 (0.883) -0.130 (0.0989)
Constant 16.83∗∗∗ (0.452) 1.188∗∗∗ (0.0502)
Observations 2762 2653
R2 0.067 0.161
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: OLS Regression. The rank dependent variable (model 1) has no missing observations.
Tests on missing observations of dependent variable 2 show no attrition by treatment group and
referendum vote.
The graphs below (Figure 4 and Figure 5) show average ranks and responses
to the economic change question from Leaver and Remainers as well as how the
perceptual gap between Leavers and Remainers widens (or narrows) by treatment
group. They graphically show that, taking the rank question for example, Leavers
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report smaller rank values than Remainers (i.e. Leavers rank the UK higher) by
roughly 3 units in both the control and the information groups. When primed, how-
ever, and irrespective of information exposure, Leavers report rank values smaller
than almost 6 units (primed group) and 5 units (prime with information group)
than Remainers. Figure 5 shows similar patterns: primed groups are different from
both the control and the information groups, and tend to display higher levels of
Leaver-Remainer divergence. In contrast, the information treatment merely results
in a small intercept shift, but does not lead to a reduction in the perceptual gaps.
In sum, we find strong support that the cognitive dissonance mechanism is what is
driving the EU issue to bias respondents’ perceptions of the UK’s economy. The
EU issue dimension triggers perceptual biases that are as strong as partisan ones:
they are heightened when group allegiance is primed and are not reduced by factual
information.
Figure 4: Average UK Economy Ranks between Leavers and Remainers by Treatment
Group
Note: Dependent Variable: “How do you think the UK’s economic growth rate currently ranks in
comparison to other the 34 developed countries part of the OECD?”
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Figure 5: Average perceptions of economic improvement between Leavers and Re-
mainers by Treatment Group.
Note: Dependent Variable: “Do you think that the economy is getting better, getting worse or
staying about the same?”
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Robustness Test: Highly Informed Respondents
We tested hypothesis 3 using a minimal information treatment: one with no mon-
etary incentives and a relatively short vignette. To further check whether more
information can counteract motivated reasoning and reduce perceptual divergence
among Leavers and Remainers, we have re-run the same panel analysis above on a
sub-sample of highly informed respondents. If the same perceptual biases in eco-
nomic evaluations are present, this would strengthen our conclusion from the exper-
imental data that being highly informed does not necessarily counteract motivated
reasoning. If highly informed respondents are prone to the same perceptual biases
as everybody else, then the effect of political divisions on perceptions is not driven
by uninformed, inattentive and impressionable voters and it is unlikely to disappear
through the use of information campaigns.
To measure levels of information, we use the EU knowledge items asked in wave
8 (the pre-referendum wave) of the British Election Study (see footnote 4 above for
a description of the variable). We assume that respondents that know how the EU
works will have based their referendum vote on their own individual assessments of
the EU, and would also have a higher capacity to know the Brexit time-line and to
more realistically link the effects of exiting the EU on the economy. We also assume
that such individuals would be interested in learning about the economy and political
developments in general, being knowledge of the EU so technical and generally hard
to come by for the average citizen (Hix 2008). It is also important to note that
the EU knowledge index was not highly correlated with the EU Referendum vote
intention variable. High knowledge respondents were not significantly more likely
to be pro-Remain.
Figures 6 and 7 below report the marginal effects graphs for both dependent
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variables. The full regression results can be found in table A11 of the Appendix.
The key inferences derived from this high EU information sub-sample are very sim-
ilar to those from the full analysis. Even in this sub-sample of highly informed
respondents, perceptions of the UK economy start to diverge among Leavers and
Remainers after the referendum result. The conclusions drawn from the minimal
information treatment that we run in the survey experiment are replicated with the
observational data: high information does not lead to convergence in perceptions























































Economy is Getting Better
Figure 6: Current Economy Performance - High EU Knowledge Respondents
Note: Linear Predictions of Present Evaluations. Higher values indicate more optimism (economy
is getting better). Covariate profile held constant at modal/mean categories: Labour, 56-65 age
bracket, A-level educational attainment, female, income: 10-20k.
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Economy Got Better in last 12 months
Figure 7: Retrospective Economy Performance - High EU Knowledge Respondents
Note: Linear Predictions of Retrospective Evaluations. Higher values indicate more optimism
(economy got better). Covariate profile held constant at modal/mean categories: Labour, 56-65
age bracket, A-level educational attainment, female, income: 10-20k.
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Conclusion
There is a wealth of evidence in the literature that partisanship generates a ‘per-
ceptual screen’, which shapes both perceptions and behaviors. In this paper, we
have extended this literature by examining the presence of perceptual biases along
non-partisan fault-lines in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. We find consid-
erable evidence of biases in perceptions of both present and retrospective economic
performance along Brexit-lines. While there was no perceptual gap between Leavers
and Remainers before the referendum, economic perceptions polarized afterwards.
Albeit exposed to the exact same economic context, Leavers and Remainers devel-
oped distinct perceptions of the state of the country’s economy in the aftermath of
the referendum. The panel data analysis shows that once the referendum outcome
was revealed, Leavers and Remainers changed their perceptions of the economy
in line with their vote choice. As the winners of the vote, Leavers became more
optimistic about the economy. As the losers, Remainers developed more negative
economic perceptions. This is not due simply to salience and revealed information
post-referendum: the perceptual gap is mostly driven by those who voted in the
referendum, i.e. those who behaviourally committed to the Leave-Remain divide,
which is compatible with the cognitive dissonance mechanism. These findings are
also compatible with similar studies on the effect of partisanship on economic per-
ceptions, which find that voters’ economic evaluations become more optimistic when
the in-group party wins office and more pessimistic when the opposing camp wins
the election (Enns et al. 2012, Evans and Andersen 2006, Evans and Pickup 2010).
The survey experiment further shows that these non-partisan biases in economic
evaluations are enhanced by priming in-group identities. Moreover, in line with
recent evidence on partisan perceptual biases, we find that providing factual infor-
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mation on the economy does little to reduce the gap in perceptions between Leavers
and Remainers (Nyhan and Reifler 2010, Bullock 2011, Kuklinski et al. 2000). The
finding is also replicated by carrying out the panel analysis on high-knowledge re-
spondents: the post-referendum biases outlined above hold for high knowledge in-
dividuals as well as for low knowledge respondents.
The evidence points to cognitive dissonance as a key psychological mechanism
explaining Brexit-related perceptual biases. The timing of the perceptual gap be-
tween Leavers and Remainers, and the finding that it is stronger among voters than
non-voters, is in line with the hypothesis that perceptual biases are ex post ratio-
nalization of prior actions. Furthermore, the experimental evidence reveals these
biases are more pronounced when respondents are reminded of the referendum and,
specifically, of their allegiance to the Leave-Remain in-groups, which heightens the
psychological state of vicarious dissonance.
The study has several implications. First, it has implications for the economic
voting model. Research has shown that governments are rewarded electorally when
voters believe the economy is going well. However, the assumption that perceptions
of the economy track the economic reality - and that the economic vote is related to
actual government performance - is further challenged here. We know from numer-
ous studies that perceptions of the economy are shaped by partisan in-group cues
(Bartels 2002, Enns et al. 2012). In this paper, we have demonstrated that other
political divisions can have the same effect, further complicating voters’ perceptions
of the economy.
The second implication concerns party system realignment (Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998). Since economic evaluations matter for government approval and
electoral success, and since we demonstrate that economic evaluations may be
swayed by issues that internally divide parties, the evidence on Brexit biases in-
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dicate that such divisions could create incentives for realignment along Brexit lines.
For example, if a party knows that a particular position on Brexit may reinforce
the economic message they want to send to the electorate (positive if in govern-
ment, negative if in opposition), the party may be encouraged to more forcefully
pick the relevant stance on the issue, resolving any internal division. The party will
then alienate some voters while attracting new ones, and this may lead to a gradual
realignment, as we have witnessed in the British context since the Brexit referen-
dum, with Leavers shifting to the Conservative Party and Remainers shifting to
Labour and the Liberal Democrats (Hobolt 2018). But this may also apply to other
contexts with cross-cutting divisions, such as separatism in Catalonia. Studies have
shown that whenever the separatist-unionist divide becomes more salient, separatism
changes the parameters of economic voting (Serrano 2019, Mart́ı and Cetrà 2016,
Bosch 2016, Muñoz and Tormos 2015). This paper identifies the process through
which alternative political divisions can put pressure on the party system.
Finally, the paper has implications for the study of direct democracy. Referen-
dums allow voters to decide directly on policy issues and can be seen as a quintessen-
tial democratic exercise. However, we show that referendums can trigger divisions,
induce polarization and perceptual biases. While popular antipathy towards the
EU in the UK was long in the making (Evans and Menon 2017, Curtice 2017), the
salience of the EU issue was far lower than core concerns such as the economy, health
care and immigration prior to the referendum. The referendum itself led to the rise
in the salience of the EU issue (YouGov 2019). What is more, it triggered identifica-
tion and affective polarization along Remain-Leave lines (Curtice 2017, Hobolt et al.
2020). This study has demonstrated that divisive referendums may trigger, or en-
hance, perceptual biases in how voters see the economy, which could have long-term
consequences that go beyond the policy question on the ballot paper.
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